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IJYDUSTRIAL 
·ADVISORY 
SUBCOMM/TfEE 
REPORT ON 
REQULATIOJY Of 
. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
AJYD COMPEIITIOJY 
The Effects of Domestic Policies of the Federal Government 
upon Inno_vation by Small Businesses 
Innovation is an essential ingredient for economic 
and social growth. It is the driving force that increases 
productivity and that results in new products, processes, 
and services. Innovations create new and better jobs, 
reduces production costs and prices, increases foreign 
sales, and increases real personal income so that our 
citizens can finance major advancements in the qualities 
of life such as better education, improved health care, 
increased longevity, and more leisure and recreation. 
Without innovation, economic stagnation occurs 
resulting in rising prices, decreased employment, and 
increased foreign competition-all symptoms of stag-
nation including inflation. Inflation, our nation's major 
problem is, in our opinion, a direct result of a large 
decline in private sector innovation over the past decade. 
To a large extent, the mandates of the U.S. electorate 
to fulfill basic social and human needs of our citizens 
requires a rapid rate of economic growth. Such social 
and economic growth can only occur with vigorous 
private sector innovation. 
SMALL BUSINESSES MAKE A 
DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE 
CONTRIBUTION TO INNOVATION 
The economic history of the United States is replete 
with examples of small innovators making major con-
tributions. From the late 1700's through the 1970's 
a major source of technological advancement was the 
result of individual inventors and entrepreneurs work-
ing independently of our large industrial corporations, 
universities, and government laboratories. This is par-
ticularly true in situations where radically new concepts 
have been introduced. 
In our early history we had Eli Whitney in 1793 with 
his cotton gin and Robert Fulton with the steamboat in 
the 1840's. These two innovations had an enormous 
impact on young America. Later came the railroads. 
Next, in telecommunications, we had Morse and Bell, 
whose contributions greatly accelerated the growth of 
our economy. Similarly, Edison, Westinghouse, Mc-
Cormack, the Wright Brothers, Ford, and DeForest 
made introductions that laid the foundation for further 
economic advancements. This is only a partial list. 
All of these innovators were small guys. 
The same trend continued after World War II with the 
success stories of Land at Polarioid and Watson at 
International Business Machines. During the 1960's 
we saw the emergence of companies such as Xerox, 
Digital Equipment, and Hewlett-Packard, each be-
ginning as individuals with their small companies who 
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were free and able to innovate. In addition to these 
better known names, there were thousands of small 
high-technology companies spawned during the 1950's 
that have created major growth in our economy and 
have increased the quantity alnd quality of employment. 
A recent study by the National Science Foundation 
concluded that in the post World War II period, firms 
with less than 1,000 employees were responsible for 
half of the "most significant new industrial products and 
processes." Firms with 100 or fewer employees pro-
duced 24 percent of such innovations. In addition, the 
cost per innovation in a small firm was found to be less 
than in a large firm since small firms produced 24 times 
more major innovations per research and development 
dollar expended as did large firms. Yet small firms 
conduct only 3 percent of U.S. research and develop-
ment. While there is much innovation that can only 
occur in large resourceful companies, small firms are 
often more adverturesome and have a greater propensity 
for risk taking, and accordingly are able to move faster 
and use resources more efficiently than large companies. 
We believe that there is something fundamental about 
the unusual ability of small firms to innovate that must 
be preserved for the sake of healthy economic and social 
growth in the United States. 
SMALL INNOVATIVE BUSINESSES 
CREATE JOBS AND TAX REVENUES 
AT A RAPID RATE 
The role of small innovative businesses in stimulating 
economic growth can be seen from two recent studies. 
The first, by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Development Foundation, shows compounded average 
annual growth from 1969 to 1974 for the following three 
groups of companies: 
Mature companies 
Innovative companies . . . 
Young high-technology 
companies ..... .... . 
Sales 
(percentage) 
11.4 
13.2 
42.5 
Jobs 
(percentage) 
0.6 
4.3 
40.7 
In this study, mature companies were Bethlehem Steel, 
DuPont, General Electric, General Foods, International, 
Paper and Procter and Gamble. Innovative companies 
were Polaroid, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 
International Business Machines, Xerox, and Texas 
Instruments. Young high-technology companies included 
Data General, National Semiconductor, Compugraphics, 
Digital Equipment, and Marion Laboratories. The com-
panies selected in each group were, in every case, leaders 
in their particular industry. 
The M.I.T. report states: 
It is worth noting that during the 5-year period, 
the six mature companies with combined sales of 
$3 6 billion in 197 4 experienced a net gain of only 
25,000 jobs, whereas the five young, high-technology 
companies with combined sales of only $857 million 
had a net increase in employment of almost 35,000 
jobs. The five innovative companies with combined 
sales of $21 billion during the same period created 
106,000 jobs. 
This study also observed that the innovative com-
panies produced three times the level of tax revenues as 
a percentage of sales as did the mature firms. 
Conclusions similar to those mentioned above 
emerged from a study of 269 firms by the American 
Electronic Association. In February 1978, Dr. Edwin V. 
Zschau of the A.E.A. presented the results of that study 
to the Senate Select Committee on Small Business. 
The report showed the following growth of employment 
for new established firms as contrasted to more mature 
companies: 
Years 
since 
founding 
20+ 
10-20 
5-10 
15 
Stage of 
Development 
Mature . . . .. . .. . 
Teenage .. . . ... . 
Developing . .... . 
Startup ..... . .. . 
Employment 
Growth 
Rates in 
1976 
(percentage) 
0.5 
17.4 
27.4 
57.7 
Dr. Zschau also reported that annual benefits to the 
economy realized in 197 6 for each $100 of equity 
capital that had been invested in startup companies 
founded between 1971 and 1975 were : 
• Foreign sales .. . . . .. . . ... . .. .. . . $70 per year 
• Personal income taxes . .. ........ $15 per year 
• Federal corporate taxes . .. ...... . $15 per year 
• State and local taxes .... . . . . . .... $ 5 per year 
• Total taxes .. . ........ . .. .. . . .. $35 per year 
This data shows that the benefits of investment in 
small innovative ventures are large (e.g., jobs are 
created and these jobs are kept at home-exports are 
created instead of imports-a new $35 per year flow in 
tax revenues is realized for each $100 initial invest-
ment). This large and powerful flow of benefits starts 
soon after the investment is made, and the benefits are 
substantially greater than those of large corporations. 
The huge benefits derived from a favorable climate 
for small business innovation is apparent from this 
review of the contributions to economic growth made 
by individual entrepreneurs and their small companies. 
If the United States desires to bring inflation under 
control and to continue to enjoy the economic and social 
benefits of innovation, individual entrepreneurs and their 
small companies must be free to engage in innovation. 
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THE ENVIRONMENT FOR SMALL 
BUSINESS INNOVATION IS NOT 
HEALTHY 
It is clear to us that innovation is the keystone of 
economic and social growth, and that individual entre-
preneurs and their small innovative businesses have 
contributed a disproportionately large share of innova-
tion. It is also clear that the climate for the formation 
and nurturing of small innovative enterprises in America 
has suffered a major deterioration over the past 10 years 
and as a result innovation has withered. 
There are no concise indices for innovation, although 
productivity is one measurable result. From the close 
of World War II until the mid-1960's, the average 
annual productivity increase for each manufacturing 
worker was approximately 4.1 percent. From the late 
1960's through the mid 1970's, it averaged 1.6 percent 
per year. In 1978 it was 1.0 percent, and some econo-
mists are predicting a rate of 0.4 percent for 1979. 
This is a tenfold decline that has occurred steadily over 
the past 15 years. 
Similar trends of a substantial downward nature can 
be observed in the flow of capital to small firms. In the 
7 years from 1969 through 197 5, the amount of capital 
acquired by small firms with less than $5 million in net 
worth from public markets declined from approximately 
$1,500 million to approximately $15 million-a hun-
dredfold decrease. No significant improvement has oc-
curred in the past 3 years. However, during this period 
of catastrophic decline, capital raised by all corpora-
tions in the public security markets increased from $28 
billion in 1972 to over $41 billion in 1975, or an 
increase of approximately 50 percent. This hundredfold 
decline in capital flow to small innovative enterprises is 
indicative of the decline in small business innovation 
because risk-capital is an essential ingredient of inno-
vation. 
Without precise indices for small business innovation, 
it is impossible for us to quantify this key factor accu-
rately. It is our observation as experienced entre-
preneurs in our respective industries however, that the 
vigor in small business innovation has substantially 
declined. We would estimate that this decline amounts 
to a level of 10 percent (or less) of the average inno-
vation from 1950 to 1970-or at least a tenfold decline. 
We regret that we cannot be more precise in estimating 
this important factor, but we believe that this estimate, 
based upon our personal observations, is realistic. 
In our opinion, a renaissance in innovation in Amer-
ica is possible, but a basic systemic change must first 
occur in governmental policies affecting small innovative 
businesses. The needs of innovators , their incentives to 
innovate, and obstacles to their creativity are often sub-
stantially different for small firms than for large mature 
corporations. In most cases government policymakers 
and administrators fail to recognize this critical differ-
ence between large and small businesses. As a result, 
major constraints to innovation unintentionally imposed 
by government must be modified if a rebirth of vigorous 
innovation is to occur in the United States. 
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 
Report of the 
Industrial Subcommittee on 
Regulation of Industry Structure 
and Competition 
BACKGROUND 
The Domestic Policy Review of government impact 
upon innovation and its effect upon industry structure 
and competition comes at a critical stage in the evolu-
tion of America's worldwide economic role. 
In the 200 years of this country's existence, the 
world has witnessed a small agrarian economy grow 
to become, in the post-World War II era, the dominant 
economic force in the world. 
But America's role has changed, in many ways 
dramatically. Yet the laws and policies governing an 
economy of one era-that of U.S. dominance-have 
not adjusted to the reality that the United States is 
now but one of several major economic powers whose 
combined strength well exceeds our own. 
It is the recognition of that new economic reality, 
that prompts a series of precise recommendations aimed 
at redressing the growing diminution of America's 
economic strength. 
Importantly, the President, through his initiation of 
a serious policy review of innovation in America, im-
plicitly recognizes innovation's key role in ensuring the 
long-term well-being of our nation's economy. 
In so doing, he has helped lay the groundwork for 
an important bridge between industry and Government. 
Too often in the past, the interaction between business 
and Government could only be characterized as ad-
versarial. By drawing representatives of business into 
the policy processes of the Administration, attitudinal 
barriers that have separated business and Government 
can be breached. 
THE CRITICAL ISSUE 
At the center of this Subcommittee's examinations 
was the certainty that economic growth and long-term 
economic health and stability is dependent upon inno-
vation. It is the essential force that generates new 
products and processes, creates productivity advance-
ment and stimulates constructive competitive activity. 
In its study of the innovation climate in the United 
States and Government's effect upon industry struc-
ture and competition, the Subcommittee reached one 
overriding conclusion. That is that the policies as well 
as the philosophy that today guide antitrust and regu-
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latory practice must be rethought in light of a variety 
of new worldwide economic forces that now prevail and 
the less dominant role this country occupies on the 
economic stage. 
It is in these two important areas of government 
interaction with business- regulation and antitrust-
where the most profound effects are present in the 
structural and competitive nature of American busi-
ness and industry. 
A REVISED CHARTER FOR 
REGULATION 
The principle animating regulatory authority, as ·n 
the case of antitrust policy, has been accepted by so ety 
at large as a necessary and proper function~ gov-
ernment. When regulatory practice is conduc d with 
prudence and consistency, it can improve t climate 
for innovation. 
In recent years, however, inconsistent a Cl sometimes 
unreasonable regulatory actions have aused, in the 
Subcommittee's judgment, an unprod ctive diversion 
of resources. 
In part, this diversion is from r ources that would 
otherwise contribute to innovatio : funds for R. & D. 
are diverted to testing programs or environmental and 
health effects, greater than pru ence dictates, reducing 
the funds available for new oduct or process innova-
ti on. 
Pollution control reso ces are diverted to mandated 
process changes rather an allowing industry to reach 
its own innovative s utions that achieve the desired, 
legal end result. T is added expense reduces capital 
that would normal go to innovative productivity gains. 
The risks of inn ative actions, too, have been inhibited 
by the uncerta· ty of regulatory policy and the frequent 
lack of con stency between and within regulatory 
bodies. 
This u certainty may be the greatest inhibitor to 
the inn ation process and requires serious attention 
and re ponse from the regulatory bodies and, in the 
Su7i:c mittee's judgment, the Administration. 
I all of these areas and more, the Subcommittee 
ha focused on what it sees as the critical regulatory 
issues and proposes constructive solutions that can 
accelerate the innovation process-while preserving the 
principle of appropriate regulatory oversight of th: J 
Nation's economic machinery. /l 
A A NEW VIEW OF ANTITRUST POLICY 
Standing as a cornerstone of American economic 
policy is its body of antitrust law. The principle under-
lying that body of law is the support and protection of 
true competition. Where innovation has been stimulated 
by antitrust policy, the country has richly benefited. 
Where it has not, particularly at this critical juncture 
in economic history, antitrust policy must be recast 
to accommodate a whole new set of worldwide and 
domestic realities. 
In specific terms, the Subcommittee concluded that 
Government must carefully reexamine foreign com-
petitors' actions within the domestic economy-re-
examine them against the same standards applying to 
U.S. companies. Joint research activities and acqui-
sitions in the domestic market by ex-U.S. firms, each 
demand study and change. 
Likewise, new thinking is in order that would re-
ward not penalize competitive advantage achieved 
through innovative actions-rewarding growth through 
the creation of new technology as opposed to growth 
by financial or economic force. 
A wholly new scale of antitrust values must be 
placed upon achieving significant technological break-
throughs by joint efforts and aiding small advanced 
technology businesses reach their greatest economic 
potential through merger with larger units. 
Each of these issues within a proposed new frame-
work for antitrust policy is examined and illustrated 
in detail in the accompanying report. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 
In the body of the accompanying report 
found seven specific issues relating to the imp t regu-
latory and antitrust actions have upon indu ry struc-
ture and competition. 
Each is followed by detailed courses of ction recom-
mended and is illustrated with example and references 
to actual e.xperiences, for the most rt witnessed by 
Subcommittee members. 
In advancing these findings fo consideration within 
the Administration's total Dom tic Policy Review, the 
Subcommittee expresses its jo· t commitment with the 
President and his Administ tion to do all within its 
power to help restore the a ropriate climate for height-
ened innovation. And it urther joins with the Admin-
istration in its efforts t ensure the long-term economic 
strength and viability f America, at home and abroad. 
Issue No. 1.- consistency of Regulation 
ation 
Changing jectives or uncertain standards of regu-
lation, as ell as uncertainty in the methods for meas-
uring co pliance, act to slow innovation. When regu-
lation j the same or different regulatory agencies is 
contradictory or when standards or methods of meas-
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uring compliance are not stabilized for an appropri te 
time period, many firms a·re not willing or able to ac pt 
the risk of committing resources to potential inn 
tions. The net effect is to reduce competition. 
RECOMMENDED ACTION 
1. Each regulatory agency should issue a lo g range 
statement of regulatory intent that could serv as guide-
lines for both the agency and the regulated. his state-
ment of intent should require appropriate otice prior 
to any changes to accommodate the long-r ge planning 
of the regulated. 
2. Whenever two or more agencies re developing 
regulations or policy on a single issue o interdependent 
issues, an interagency coordinating co ittee should be 
formed to assure consistency. 
3. Where a single industry or co pany within that 
industry has related compliance req rements controlled 
by more than a single law, int agency and intra-
agency consultation must occur ensure consistency 
between and within agencies. 
Illustrations of "lnconsis~e cy of 
Regulation Reduces Inno · ation" 
Example No. 1.-Based on years of research, a 
chemical company develo d a plastic beverage con-
tainer suitable for soft dr'nks. The plastic was a co-
polymer of styrene and crylonitrile. The advantages 
of the container were ts light weight, convenience, 
safety, and recycleabirty. In the development stage, 
extensive data was s mitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration showmg that under intended condi-
tions of use, no acr onitrile could be detected migrat-
ing into the bottle ontents. In February 1975, FDA 
issued a Final Re ulation setting forth the conditions 
under which acr onitrile "may safely be used in soft 
drink bottles." 
Following F A approval, the manufacturer and a 
major soft d nk firm committed considerable re-
sources and ort to the introduction of this wholly 
new packagi g concept. Consumer tests quickly en-
dorsed the 1ghtweight, shatter-resistant plastic bottle 
by a 3 to 1 margin. New manufacturing capacity was 
added to ep pace with consumer demand. 
An inte im technical report on chronic toxicity tests 
on rats s owed an excess of tumors in rats fed acrylo-
nitrile. oncurrently FDA tested the plastic bottles 
under e aggerated conditions and concluded that acrylo-
nitrile ould migrate into the contents. Based on these 
data, DA suspended the approval of the bottle as a 
soft ink container. Despite several legal challenges, 
the an is still in effect. 
a result of the action, approximately 1,000 people 
wer laid off and the company incurred a loss of approx-
im tely $100 million. 
Example No. 2.-Capital formation is also adversely 
ected by the uncertainty about the future of regula-
1ons governing the introduction of new processes and 
roducts. Take this example from the energy area.1 A 
1 Synfuels Interagency Task Force, Recommendations for a Synthetic 
Fuels Commercialization Pro gram , Report submitted to the President's 
Energy Resources Council, vol. I , Washington, Government Printing Office, 
1975, p . 134. 
task force of the President's Energy Resources Council, 
in evaluating the requirement for environmental impact 
statements, claims that the major uncertainty was not 
whether a project would be allowed to proceed, but 
rather the length of time that it would be delayed 
pending the issuance of an environmental impact state-
ment that would stand up in court. In assessing the 
overall impact of Government regulatory activity on the 
establishment of a new energy industry, the task force 
concluded ". . . some of these requirements could 
easily hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to 
build and operate a synthetic fuels plant." 
Issue No. 2.-Innovation is Negatively 
Impacted by Regulating the Means 
Rather than the Ends 
In the last 10 years, the United States has instituted 
a large number of social laws and regulations that have 
a major impact on the economy's rate of growth, the 
rate of inflation and the degree of competition within 
the industrial sector of the economy. If the laws and 
regulations had controlled only the output, innovation 
within firms and within industries to achieve the goals 
would have been stimulated and the type of competi-
tion and resulting industry structure would have been 
similar to that which would be expected to result from 
the competitive market system. 
However, the regulations resulting from the adoption 
of new social regulations have not been goal oriented. 
Rather than requiring a specific output such as acci-
dents per 1,000 hours worked or parts per million of 
a substance in a plant's effluents, the regulations control 
the industrial processes themselves. Such process regu-
lations (sometimes referred to as input as opposed to 
output regulations) prohibit innovation as a means of 
achieving the required goals. Frequently, they have 
severe financial impacts on individual firms or plants; 
the nonproductive expense has a multiplier impact on 
innovation related to product or process improvements. 
Importantly, the input regulations inhibit competition 
and dictate, although not directly, industry structure. 
Thereby such regulation negatively impacts capital 
investment and aggravates the Nation's inflation 
problems. 
The problems associated with such process regula-
tion are increased by both the adversary atmosphere 
that exists between the regulatory agencies and industry 
and the lack of stability in the regulations or the reason-
ableness of the timing parameters required to achieve 
compliance. 
* * * * * 
RECOMMENDED ACTION 
1. Regulations promulgated to achieve desired social 
goals should be limited to standards of performance. 
They should not dictate the processes used by industry 
to achieve the standards. Such a refocusing of regula-
tions would foster innovation both in meeting the 
standards and, because such regulations would allow 
compliance at lower cost than the current process 
regulation, industry could devote more resources to 
product and process innovation. 
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The benefits to the Nation that could reasonably be 
expected from such a reorientation of the regulatory 
approach are clearly great although an exact quantifi-
cation of the benefits is not possible. Example 1, .which 
discusses the impact of mandating coal use in industrial 
boilers and requiring "best available control tech-
nology" (BACT) to meet environmental goals, results 
in about two-thirds of the 1977 to 1990 incremental 
coal consumption in industrial boilers becoming un-
economic at an estimated cost to the Nation of $1 to 
2 billion/yr. If similar cost estimates were available 
for all of the process dictating regulations, the total 
cost to the Nation would be many times greater. 
2. A nonadversary approach should be encouraged 
via directives to the regulatory agencies to increase 
industry participation in regulation development. The 
achievement of social goals can be most efficiently 
achieved if both business and Government work to-
gether. The adversary approach to regulating industry 
needlessly complicates the achievement of the stand-
ards, may increase the costs of both business and Gov-
ernment of regulation implementation and can inhibit 
competition and adversely impact industry structure. 
The second example relates a case involving the imple-
mentation of the Toxic Substances Control Act which 
is being done in a nonadversary manner that will save 
both industry and Government expense. Regrettably, 
this type of example is scarce. The various trade presses 
are replete with examples of adversary governmental 
regulators' relations with business. 
3. Time schedules for regulatory compliance should 
take into account new technology required and current 
plant investment. Unrealistically short times and the 
requirements for utilization of the best available control 
technology often dictate utilization of a single tech-
nology and should be avoided. Technological innova-
tion is frequently time consuming. Short compliance 
schedules can severely limit competition among firms 
in both meeting the regulatory standard and in the 
design of the process or product. 
Illustration of "Innovation is Negatively 
Impacted by Regulating the Means 
Rather than the Ends" 
Example No. 1.-The Mandatory Coal Conversion 
Act requires that, after 1985, coal be consumed in all 
new and replacement industrial boilers larger than 100 
million BTU/ hour. An examination of the economics 
of industrial energy consumption and pre-1977 en-
vironmental regulations indicated that low sulfur west-
ern coal would have . been economic in much of the 
Midwest and Gulf Coast regions of the country. The 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, however, require 
the adoption of the "best available control technology" 
(BACT) to both meet emission limitations and a per-
centage reduction in pollution from untreated fuel. 
With current technology, BACT will probably require 
the installation of flue gas scrubbers on all industrial 
coal burning boilers above 100 million BTU / hour and 
significantly limit the flexibility of companies to pur-
chase lower sulfur coal to meet environmental standards. 
The BACT requirement increases the costs of indus-
trial process steam in the range of 10 to 12 percent 
for those plants that could have met environmental 
